Latin American Immigration as a Determinant of US Foreign Aid Allocation by Roberson, Anna B.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin American Immigration as a Determinant of US Foreign Aid Allocation 
 
 
By Anna B. Roberson 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty 
of the University of North Carolina 
in partial fulfillment of the require- 
ments of a degree with Honors in 
Political Science. 
 
 
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:      
 
 
___________________________________	  
Advisor: Layna Mosley 
 
 
___________________________________	  
Cameron Ballard-Rosa 
 
 
___________________________________	  
Sarah Treul 
  
	   2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….….....4 
Foreign Aid Process…………………………………………………...…………………..6 
Literature Review……………………………………………………………….………..12 
i. Determinants of Aid ……...…………...…………………………..……..12 
ii. Foreign Aid to Latin America………………………………..…………..14 
iii. Immigration as Aid Determinant………………………..……………….17 
Theory…………………………………………………………………………..………..19 
Analysis of Congressional Hearings…………………………………………..…………27 
Data and Methods…………………………………………………………..……………34 
Results……………………………………………………………………..……………..42 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………..…………………...52 
Works Cited…………………………………………………………...…………………57 
Citations—Congressional Hearings………………………………..…………………….62 
Appendix A: Congressional Hearings Sample……………………………………….…..64 
Appendix B: Data Appendix…………………………………………………….……….65 
Appendix C: Interview Appendix…………………………………………………….….70 
Appendix D: Additional Tables………………………………………………………….71 
  
	   3 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Aid Determinants, Overall Sample ……………………………………………..43 
 
Table 2: Aid Determinants, Split Sample………………………………………………...48 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Country-years Across Income Quartiles………………………..71 
  (If in Model 4b Sample) 
 
Table 4: Number of Observations per Country in “low-income” Category………………71 
  (If in Model 5a Sample) 
 
Figure 1: Mean Level of Aid, All Years………………………………………………….37 
 
Figure 2: Immigration per Capita, All Years……………………………………………..38 
 
Figure 3: Absolute Number of Immigrants, All Years…………………………………...38 
 
Figure 4: Migration and GDP per Capita (“Migrant Hump”)…….………………………41 
 
Figure 5: Implied Effects on Aid Allocation (As Implied by Model 1)………………….45 
 
Figure 6: Conditional Effect of Development on Aid……………………………………47 
  (Migrants per Capita and ODA, by Income Quartile) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	   4 
INTRODUCTION   
Despite the prominence of foreign aid in policy debates and media discussion, foreign aid 
only accounts for one percent of the US Budget (Center for Global Development 2015), and only 
0.2 percent of US Gross National Income (OECD 2013; Center for Global Development 2015).  
One might expect aid to go to the neediest or the poorest or the most deserving of countries, but 
scholars know it is not that simple.  We know that some things matter very much in aid 
allocation, such as strategic ties between donor and recipient governments, development, and 
wars or disasters. However, these known determinants do not account for all of the variation in 
aid from year to year, and I endeavor to further the knowledge on determinants of foreign aid. 
This is a thesis that explains how the US allocates foreign aid to Latin America, with a 
special emphasis on the factor of immigration as an explanatory variable in aid distribution.  In 
an effort to further the academic knowledge of the politics of foreign aid, I have isolated one 
factor that I believe to be under-examined and unexplored—immigration.  There are an estimated 
41 million immigrants living in the US, or about 13 percent of the total US population 
(Migration Policy 2014).  In 2013 alone, almost 402,000 people immigrated to the US from Latin 
America.1 With a few important exceptions, immigration remains largely unaddressed in the 
literature on foreign aid allocation,2 but I argue that it is a factor in the United States’ 
considerations of aid distribution. Politicians are concerned about how to respond to the large 
numbers of immigrants coming to the US through legal and extralegal means.  I contend that 
since policymakers assume that economic conditions in the country of origin are a push factor 
for migrants leaving their country of origin, and since a sufficient number of policymakers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  From my data set, as constructed from Department of Homeland Security data on immigrant origin countries. 2	  The recent work of Sarah Bermeo (2008, 2010) and David Leblang (2010) does look at immigration and aid on a 
global scale, and I discuss their work in my literature review. Gaytán-Fregoso and Lahiri (2000) and Berthélemy et 
al. (2009) take a theoretical look at the connection between aid and migration, but both these studies look at the 
effects of aid rather than its determinants. 
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believe foreign aid sometimes spurs growth, policymakers will utilize economic foreign 
assistance as a means of decreasing the need for further migration.  As such, I expect there to be 
a statistically significant relationship between the flow of migrants from each Latin American 
country and aid allocation to that country in the subsequent years. My research fills an important 
niche in the literature on foreign aid.  I use the work of other scholars as a starting point, but I 
aim to take a multi-method, process-oriented approach that traces the mechanism by which 
migration and aid are connected.  I test my theory through a series of semi-structured elite 
interviews, an analysis of congressional hearings, and a statistical analysis of US foreign aid to 
Latin America in the years 1990-2012. 
I choose to focus my research on Latin America.  If there is a relationship between 
immigration and US foreign aid allocation, the causal mechanism should be particularly evident 
in aid to Latin America.  Pew Research Center data shows that in 2012, 52.2 percent of 
immigrants in the US were from Latin America, and that the Mexico-to-US migration link was 
the most popular in the world (Brown and Patten 2014; Inkpen 2014).  The United States’ 
colonialist and imperialist tendencies led to much intervention in Latin America during the 
twentieth century, and the regions have become further entangled in the past few decades. In the 
post-Cold War context, Latin America remains a recipient of US development aid because of the 
geographic proximity and trade networks between the US and Latin America. Compared to US 
programs in other regions, US aid programs in Latin America focus less on peace and security 
concerns or unexpected humanitarian need, and more on good governance and economic 
growth.3  For these reasons, as well as for the practical reason of limiting the scope of data to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  As discerned by my analysis of congressional hearings	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investigate it more deeply, I have chosen to limit this project to the sphere of US-Latin American 
relations.  
All else being equal, I find that immigration to the US leads to increases in US aid to the 
immigrant-sending country. An analysis of congressional hearings as well as a series of 
interviews finds that immigration is a relevant part of the aid discussion in Congress.  The 
Committee on Appropriations and the aid-implementing agencies use the economic and political 
conditions of underdevelopment (that may cause migration) as justifications for increased 
development aid.  My statistical results support the hypothesis that increased immigration leads 
to increased aid, especially in low-income recipients and in the second half of the years sampled.   
I begin with a description of how foreign aid decisions are made by the federal 
government, so as to outline the important actors and give a sense of the decision-making 
timeline.  Then, I review the existing literature on foreign aid determinants and the politics of 
aid.  In the theory section, I introduce the idea that immigration is an additional determinant of 
aid allocation, and I trace the causal pathway by which the two are connected.  After the 
theoretical outline, I give an overview of my analysis of congressional hearings and report upon 
a series of statistical tests that explore numerically the importance of various factors in aid 
allocation.  I end with a discussion of the conclusions and implications of my study.   
 
THE FOREIGN AID PROCESS 
To analyze the factors that influence allocation, we must first have a firm understanding 
of the process itself.  It is particularly pertinent to consider when and how policymakers’ 
concerns about immigration might affect aid allocation.  Before beginning a theoretical 
discussion on why immigration may affect foreign aid allocation, I will discuss the aid allocation 
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process, emphasizing the points at which I expect immigration and similar country-specific 
concerns to be evident.   
Official Development Assistance, or ODA, is defined by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development  (OECD) as grants or loans to countries, territories, and 
multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments.  
These monetary flows must be administered with the objective of promoting economic 
development and welfare in developing countries, and loans must be concessional in nature 
(having a below-market interest rate or an extended interval of repayment) (OECD 2013). This 
definition generally excludes resources sent as military aid, peacekeeping enforcement, and 
programs that directly combat terrorism. 
The current US concept of international development assistance emerged after World 
War II in concordance with the Marshall Plan’s goal to help Europe recover by sending 
economic assistance. The primary vehicle through which the United States now distributes 
economic foreign assistance is the federal budget category of Foreign Affairs, or the Function 
150 account, one of 20 budget categories to which the Committee on Appropriations Committee 
allocates funds.  Major agencies, such as the Department of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) are a 
part of this function.  Oversight of this account belongs to the Subcommittee on State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Programs of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. 4  
USAID was formed in 1961 during the Kennedy administration, and MCC was created in 
2004 during the George W. Bush administration.  Both USAID and MCC are independent 
agencies of the executive branch (and separate in administration from the Department of State), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Until 2008, this subcommittee was referred to as the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs.	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but the legislative branch has significant influence in determining which specific programs 
receive funding.  USAID is responsible for about half of US foreign assistance, considerably 
more than MCC ($17.2 and $0.8 billion respectively in 2013, out of a total aid budget of $33.1 
billion)(ForeignAssistance.gov 2014). In contrast, the Department of Defense was responsible 
for $12.7 billion of foreign assistance that year. 
To become better informed about the aid allocation process and specific concerns in 
Latin America, I conducted six interviews with policy insiders.  I sent meeting requests to 26 
members of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the 
Committee on Appropriations from the 112th and 113th Congresses. I chose to use these two 
Congresses as my sample because most members of earlier Congresses are no longer serving 
(and therefore very hard to contact), or also served in one of these two Congresses.  The 29 
remaining members of the Subcommittee that I could not contact were either retired, deceased, 
or would not accept correspondence from my zip code.5  I was able to schedule three interviews 
via these requests, and three more interviews through professional connections. Of the six people 
I interviewed, two are members of Congress, two are current Congressional staffers, and two 
have past experience as staff members with the Subcommittee.  I conducted all of these 
interviews between January 20 and January 23, 2015, each one lasting 30 to 60 minutes.  The 
interviews were semi-structured and open response.  I asked about the appropriations process 
itself, specific regional concerns in Latin America, and the perceived effectiveness of aid.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Because most members of Congress do not provide an email address, I used the online meeting request forms on 
each member’s website.  Some of these forms, due to a high volume of requests, do not accept requests from a zip 
code outside of their district.  For these members, I tried unsuccessfully to contact staffers directly.  The responses to 
online requests that I received were all from staffers, some willing to connect me to the member of Congress, and 
others offering to meet with me themselves.  Further information on the interview process and respondents is in 
Appendix C. 
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At the beginning of each year, the President submits a budget request to Congress, and by 
April the Committee on the Budget sets a cap for Appropriations spending. The chair of the 
Committee on Appropriations decides upon the 302(b) allocations, which establish a limit for 
each of the subcommittee bills.  Following the 302(b) allocations, the twelve subcommittees in 
both the House and the Senate allocate funds to various projects and departments. As mentioned 
above, foreign aid falls under the directive of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Relations and 
Related Programs. The Committee’s final requests often mirror the President’s overall request 
very closely, but per-country considerations begin at the Committee level (Interviews 1, 6). The 
budget is then subjected to a set of hearings and input from related organizations. It is during this 
step, in the Congressional Budget Justifications and Committee Hearings, that various groups 
petition the needs and interests of specific countries. After the hearings, the chair and ranking 
members of the Subcommittee send a letter inviting other members to submit their views, a step 
referred to as the “member requests” (Interview 6). The House and Senate must reconcile their 
requests and approve the Appropriations Bill before the funds can be appropriated or spent.  
Several of my interviewees (3, 6) noted that the appropriations process is not very 
transparent, and that a lot of give-and-take happens behind closed doors.  Though the published 
reports may not entirely reflect the final distribution of all assistance funds, the reports are the 
best indicator of where aid was intended to go (Interview 1).  Additionally, several people 
mentioned that since most members of Congress are on multiple committees (Interview 5, 6), the 
appropriations process is long and tedious, and is often behind schedule. Some respondents (3, 6) 
mentioned that the process is very political, and said it is affected by the partisan divide within 
the Subcommittee and the fiscal situation of the year.  A few people said there was bipartisan 
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cooperation in foreign aid appropriations (Interviews 2,3,5), but others described it as a divisive 
topic (1, 6).  
The final Appropriations Bill specifies that certain amounts be spent on specific 
programs, sectors, and countries, but it also gives some leeway to the implementing agencies to 
decide exactly how to deliver the funds (Center for Global Development 2014). Several 
interview respondents expanded upon this. Two people specifically described the variation in 
oversight towards different countries (Interview 1, 3).  They remarked that for some countries 
and programs, the money is directly earmarked and itemized by the Subcommittee, for others 
there are strong (but not law-bound) suggestions, and for others still, there is little more than an 
expressed preference on behalf of Congress as to how the funds should be spent.  Another said 
that “although the agencies have some power on the ground, there is a strong tradition of 
Congressional oversight” (Interview 1). Congress also has oversight power once the bill has been 
passed, in the form of asking for reports by the agencies on how the money is being spent in 
various regions. In the past, there was a big emphasis on regular reporting by the implementing 
agencies, but now Congress is less concerned with specific program reporting (Interview 3). 
Nonetheless, Congress is a primary actor in the appropriations process, and the ultimate agent of 
oversight for foreign assistance. 
USAID allocates money to recipient governments, agencies, and organizations in the 
form of grants and contracts.  First, USAID puts together a Country Development Cooperation 
Strategy for each country.  After establishing a Development Plan for a certain nation, USAID 
decides whether a contract or direct assistance would best suit the needs of the country.  Under a 
contract, the US purchases goods and services as a means of furthering development, but with 
direct assistance the US transfers funds for the implementation of programs by the receiving 
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country.  Direct assistance can either be in the form of a grant or cooperation agreement, the 
latter of which involves more terms of conditionality.  Once USAID has decided which countries 
will receive assistance, they ask for proposals, negotiate with NGOs and other assistance 
providers within the recipient nations, and award the grants (USAID 2014b).6   
According to USAID, the main development concern in Latin America is “improving 
security and economic and political inclusion” (USAID 2014b).  The agency notes that violence 
resulting from turmoil affects the US when it “penetrates our borders” (USAID 2014a).  As a 
way to address the overarching development concerns, USAID has specified several ways in 
which foreign assistance funds can be used in Latin America.  These include mitigating the drug 
trade, supporting civil society groups, and protecting natural resources (USAID 2014b).  
Additionally, my interviewees spent significant time discussing	  the regional priorities in Latin 
America.  Some of the most commonly mentioned issues were the drug trade, regional health 
concerns such as AIDS and malaria, educational programs, good governance, economic capacity 
building, free trade, and illegal immigration.  
What, then, are the implications of the way this process works? As the Appropriations 
Bill moves through the above-enumerated process, it is pushed and pulled from all sides by 
Congress and the implementing agencies alike.  Frequently mentioned issues for the area of 
Latin America combine humanitarian, strategic and economic concerns. It is important to 
consider how this process reveals the specific determinants of aid to Latin America, and whether 
immigration is among them, as I move into a more theoretical discussion.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Millennium Challenge Corporation distributes foreign assistance intended for the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals.  Eligibility of receiving countries for MCC contracts is based upon good 
governance, economic freedom, and investment in citizen life. MCC awards compacts (large, multi-year grants), and 
threshold programs (smaller grants for targeted individual policy reforms in ineligible countries). In practice, many 
MCC grants are administered by USAID (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2015). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I outline some of the recent research on US-Latin American relations and 
the determinants of foreign aid in order to preface the discussion of immigration as an additional 
factor in aid allocation.  With a couple of important exceptions, this body of literature largely 
fails to mention international flows of people as a factor in allocation decisions.  I begin this 
overview with a general discussion of the determinants of bilateral foreign assistance, especially 
geostrategic and economic motivations of donor nations.  Then, I examine in more detail the 
specific bilateral aid relationship between the US and Latin America, both in terms of motivating 
factors and trends over time.  Lastly, I consider those scholars who discuss a connection between 
migration and aid, and how their writing acts as a starting point for my research. 
 
Determinants of Aid  
The next section will discuss in more detail the specific determinants of US aid to Latin 
America, but first I will outline the broader literature on aid allocation.  Governments have 
geopolitical and economic self-interests, which I define as follows.  Geopolitical self-interest is a 
country’s need for allies, strategic world partners, and good diplomatic relations with its 
neighboring countries.  Economic self-interest is the desire of governing officials for their 
country to prosper economically, in both domestic and global markets.  The US is motivated by 
the desires to assist other countries, to foster geopolitical stability, to expand economic 
opportunities, and, as I propose, to influence the migration decisions of people in the aid-
receiving country.   
Humanitarian concern often dominates public discussions on foreign aid (and was 
mentioned by all six of my interview respondents), but it is not often found to be significantly 
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associated with aid allocation.  Berthélemy (2006) remarks that the US is more egoistic than 
many countries, and puts their interest before humanitarian altruism.  A few scholars mention 
humanitarian concern as a factor in global studies of aid allocation (Adams 2000) or as an 
outcome rather than a motivation (Bermeo 2010), but for the most part the literature on global 
aid allocation focuses on more self-interested factors, and for the purposes of my theoretical 
discussion, so will I.  In development initiatives, there is a tension between redistribution of 
wealth and efficient development—the choice between giving to the poorest nations because 
they face the greatest disadvantage, and giving to nations that have a high capacity for 
development (Little and Clifford 2006). Several interviewees mentioned this tension.  They 
remarked that there is a trade-off between the objective needs of a recipient and the extent to 
which it is “worth it” for the US to invest in that nation if it is corrupt, unstable, or does not have 
good diplomatic ties with the US (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 6).  In an effort to make aid most effective, 
donor nations have recently paid attention to institutional consolidation, good governance, 
closing the information gap, and avoiding corruption as goals of international aid and 
development (Hout 2007).  Specifically, government effectiveness is positively correlated with 
aid allocation (Chong and Gradstein 2007; Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2007).  
Whereas the US previously considered aid a key way to contain the spread of 
Communism, contemporary geopolitical concerns differ from the broad Cold War era goal of 
gaining allies to fight communism (Coleman 2007; Hout 2007).  Since the Cold War, strategic 
motivations include using aid to cultivate beneficial political relations, alleviate global security 
concerns or crises, and achieve favorable policy in aid-receiving nations. Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) describe the importance of “friend variables” in US aid allocation, meaning that the US is 
likely to give aid to countries with similar interests or a history of bilateral diplomacy. The 
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people I interviewed also mentioned investing in diplomatic capital as one reason to give aid to 
some countries and not others—giving aid so as to foster good relations and avoid conflict in the 
future (Interviews 2, 3, 5). Alesina and Dollar (2000) also note that specific concerns/events in a 
region (such as in the “war on terror” or “war on drugs”) draw the attention of aid donors to that 
area while the issue persists.  A final geopolitical motivation of aid is the use of foreign 
assistance to influence policy in the recipient nation, under the assumption that a needy country 
that receives aid will be more likely to support policies favorable to the leaders of the donor 
country (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).  
Aid is also employed for economic self-interest, or development of the recipient nation 
for the economic benefit of the donor nation.  Donor governments often favor open economies 
and significant trading partners when distributing aid, giving to those countries whose economic 
growth will benefit the donor country most, or whose markets they want to access (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Hout 2007). Bearce and Tirone (2010) note that even “altruistic” 
aid often gives donors the benefit of opening export markets in the recipient countries for donor 
products. 
 
US Foreign Aid to Latin America  
 I have limited my study to Latin America because I expect that the United States’ 
bilateral aid allocation to Latin America is different from allocation to other regions of the world.  
In this section I enumerate some of the specific aid trends in the region.  Because Latin America 
is so close to the US geographically, there is distinctive concern for the stability of the region 
(Interview 2).  During the Cold War period, Latin American was considered a priority for 
preventing the spread of Communism, and though promoting stability is still an important goal 
	   15 
for the region, the US no longer considers Latin America to be the region in most need of 
security assistance.  Other regions receive most of the United States’ security-oriented aid, but 
Latin America is a lead recipient in the categories of “governing justly” and “economic growth 
and prosperity” (Tarnoff and Lawson 2011).  Therefore, I expect that Latin America, as an aid 
recipient, is subject to a different set of determinants than the regions that currently receive the 
most security aid or have highly-publicized civil conflict. For many years, the US was the 
hegemon in the Latin American region, and as such, the US presumed final influence in many 
areas of Latin American governance and economics. US aid to Latin America as a proportion of 
total US aid has decreased in recent years as global security priorities have shifted to eastern 
regions of the world (Meyer and Sullivan 2012), but the assumption that the US is among the 
most important outside influences in Latin America remains.   
The 1990s and early 2000s in Latin America were a time of structural adjustment, 
political transition, and recovery from the debt crises of the 1980s.  This era was characterized by 
the adoption of free trade and neoliberal policies (after much external pressure), the war on 
drugs, and the suppression of revolutionary and counterinsurgency groups in some nations 
(Council on Foreign Relations 2008). The period is also marked by the creation of free trade 
agreements such as NAFTA (1994) and CAFTA-DR (2004), though many of these efforts were 
met with heavy criticism (Eguizábal 2010).  President George W. Bush’s foreign policy towards 
Latin America involved a strong emphasis on self-defense and preemptively combating security 
concerns, such as the counternarcotic and counterinsurgency strategy of Plan Colombia (Campos 
and Prevost 2007).  
Though the specific literature regarding US aid to Latin America since 1991 is relatively 
small, it provides useful insight into the process at hand.  Latin America received the most 
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foreign aid attention during the 1960s with Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, but it has remained 
an important area of concern for foreign assistance.  Adams (2000) presents three paradigms in 
US foreign assistance to Latin America: developmental or humanitarian motivations, political 
motivations, and economic motivations.  Developmental or humanitarian concerns in the region 
stem from a moral concern for improving the human condition, and often lead to good 
governance initiatives that encourage the support of good human rights practices (Blanton 1994; 
Adams 2000).  Contrary to the previously discussed literature on global determinants of aid, 
Blanton (1994) finds that human rights are an important indicator of US aid to Latin America. 
Political motivations in Latin America have included supporting strategic allies, distributing aid 
according to US national security priorities, and working towards political stability as many of 
the governments in the region transitioned out of authoritarian regimes.  Adams defines 
economic motives as the promotion of the specific interests of multinational corporations in the 
donor country, but others (Valenzuela 2005; Viellete et al. 2007) more broadly discuss economic 
motives in terms of opening trade markets and fostering global economic growth. In Latin 
America, this involves protecting foreign investment and enhancing the capacity for trade 
(Adams 2000). 
Viellette (2007) discusses how Latin American trends mirror global interests in other 
regions.  This includes the shift of objectives towards good governance and development rather 
than direct military involvement (Viellette 2007; Myer & Sullivan 2012), incorporating a more 
participatory approach to assistance in Latin America, and working towards sustainable 
development and capacity building (Haugaard 1997). In describing the 1990s, Adams (2000) 
notes how humanitarian concerns were still present, but USAID’s programs in the Latin 
American region were more characterized by political motivations of regional stability through 
	   17 
“democratic peace,” as well as neoliberal economic motives (on behalf of MNCs) of enhancing 
the region as a trading partner and good environment for Foreign Direct Investment.  Valenzuela 
(2005) notes that security motives have not disappeared; they have simply shifted from 
containing communism to promoting regional stability and combating drug violence.  In my 
interviews, several people touted the success of Plan Colombia as a flagship example of how to 
address security issues in the region (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 6). Interestingly, Adams (2000, p.107) 
notes that one of the goals for aid during this time period was to decrease immigration, but 
primarily migration generated by political repression rather than immigration generated by 
economic need. This sentiment was echoed in three of the interviews I conducted (Interviews 1, 
2, 4).  Meyer (2012, 2014) states that since 2000, assistance in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region is shifting away from military-based security aid and towards democracy promotion, 
environmental conservation, and development aid.  Additionally, Adams (2000) notes a shift 
towards using economic measures such as sanctions and the interests of private institutions to 
garner change in Latin America. 
 The characteristics of US bilateral aid to Latin America set an important backdrop in the 
context of regional priorities.  Moving forward, I will focus my attention on the specific factor of 
immigration and how it operates as a determinant of aid even after we account for other 
significant determinants. 
 
Immigration as Aid Determinant 
Very little has been said about the role of immigration in foreign aid allocation, but what 
has been written provides a starting point for my study.  I posit that Latin American immigration 
to the US functions as an additional motive for the US to give foreign aid to certain countries. In 
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this case, politicians care about the economic development of the aid recipient because they want 
to keep potential migrants in that country.  Through this mechanism, donors use foreign aid to 
strengthen the economic capacity of recipient countries in the long-term, so that migrants are not 
forced to migrate for lack of economic opportunity.  According to economic theories of 
migration, prosperity at home decreases the need for migrants to move (Massey, et al. 1998). 
Ideally, in a model where aid decreases migration, the receiving country will experience growth 
as a result of aid, and the perceived disparity of wages and economic opportunities between the 
two nations will decrease, lessening the incentive for migration.  
There is evidence of a relationship between migration and foreign aid on a global scale. 
Bermeo (2008), as an unexpected finding in her larger work on foreign aid determinants, 
discovered that countries with more migration to the donor nation receive more aid.7  She notes 
that “industrialized countries are increasingly worried about migration, particularly the arrival of 
low-skilled, undocumented individuals” (Bermeo 2010, 18). She then asserts that national 
governments aim to improve economic conditions in immigrant-sending countries as a way to 
decrease immigration, quoting USAID’s goal of “addressing the underlying causes of large-scale 
illegal migration by promoting regional stability” (18).  Bermeo finds that donors may choose to 
give more aid to countries whose immigrants are a large foreign presence in the country in an 
attempt to decrease migration push factors (2010). The argument leaves an excellent opportunity 
for me to explore in more detail the effect of immigrants within the specific context of US 
foreign aid to Latin America.  
Bermeo has loosely established that a connection exists between aid and migration, but 
she does not focus on Latin America, and she does not look qualitatively at the allocation process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  David Leblang (2010) also addresses the connection between the international political economy and migration 
politics, though he focuses on the power of diaspora communities to influence decisions of foreign direct 
investment.    
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to determine whether it involves the concerns about migration that she assumes exist. By 
narrowing the scope to Latin America during the years 1991-2012, I can focus on one region 
specifically, thereby eliminating some of the factors that may vary between regions but not over 
time.  This is a practical consideration, but there are also theoretical reasons for limiting my 
study to Latin America.  In the US, when politicians or popular media discuss “immigration,” 
most people think about immigration from Latin America, as 52.2 percent of migrants in the US 
are from Latin America (Brown and Patten 2014).  Since Latin America is the focus of public 
opinion on immigration, I expect that this is where the causal mechanism between immigration 
and aid would exist most clearly and most strongly.  In the next section, I discuss why this 
should be the case, and I trace the causal mechanism that connects Latin American immigration 
to US foreign aid allocation.  Then I look qualitatively for evidence that this is a plausible claim.  
Finally, I test my hypotheses quantitatively to see if a statistically significant relationship exists.  
 
THEORY  
I argue that there is a causal relationship between migration flows and aid allocation; one 
that should be evident in a statistical analysis.  Below, I suggest that stemming the flow of 
immigration to the US is an additional US goal of development aid to Latin America, and that 
foreign aid is used as an attempt to reduce the need for immigration by addressing the root cause 
of underdevelopment in the immigrant-sending nation.     
The following causal process is my argument for why Latin American immigration to the 
US affects foreign aid allocation.  Immigrants move from their home country to more developed 
countries to improve their individual or community economic situation, or to flee conflict or 
disaster.  As more and more immigrants come to the US, there is a general public concern about 
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immigration, and policymakers are apprehensive about how to respond to the immigrant flows.  
To address concerns of immigration, policymakers sometimes use a “root causes” approach 
(Castles and Van Hear 2011) to address the structural situation that propels migration.  In a root 
causes approach where underdevelopment is a target root cause, aid is one channel through 
which policymakers hope to address migration from Latin America.8  At this time, I will discuss 
each of these steps in fuller detail.  
My first working assumption is that policymakers are concerned about immigration to the 
US. Whether policymakers consider immigration in terms of the cumulative number of 
immigrants or the changing flows of incoming people, they are compelled to address 
immigration.  Two people I interviewed mentioned immigration as a policy concern in the Latin 
American region even before I asked, and a third mentioned that even if policymakers are not 
“worried” about immigration, they respond to the concern expressed by their constituents 
(Interviews 1, 2, 6).  
Next, I assume that politicians at several points along the ideological spectrum tend to 
agree that reducing immigration is desirable, though their underlying motives might be quite 
different.9  There is strong disagreement as to whether immigrants in the US are helping or 
hurting the US economy.  Generally, more conservative politicians and constituents contend that 
immigrants are generating costs for the US by using collective resources (such as jobs and 
healthcare), while more liberal people view immigrants as contributing to the United States’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Other regional concerns for Latin America, such as repression or drug-related violence, might also be root causes 
of migration.  These root causes, however, merit a different strategy, one that does not use development as a solution 
and probably not one that directly involves foreign aid.  For my theory, I focus on the assumption that many 
migrants (though not all) migrate for economic improvement, making underdevelopment one (but not the only) root 
cause that policymakers can target.  9	  Though popular media most often refers to unauthorized migration, it is not clear that the public opinion on 
immigrants distinguishes between those who are documented and those who are not.  For this reason (as well as for 
practical data reasons), my study discusses the two together.  In my data analysis, I try one unit of measurement that 
accounts for some of the undocumented population, as a test of robustness. For my theory, however, the two are not 
distinguished.  	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culture and economy, especially in the agriculture and construction industries.  Considerations of 
future immigration, however, lead both conservative and liberal politicians towards the 
conclusion that reduced immigration is desirable.  The more conservative group favors a 
decrease in Latin American immigration to the US (specifically, unauthorized immigration) 
because they view it as negative for the US—both for border security concerns and reasons of 
economic protectionism for native citizens.  For them, immigration is a threat to the nation-state, 
and it is something to be controlled (Castles 2000). The more liberal group, however, may also 
support reduced Latin American immigration to the US, insomuch as it signals a decrease in 
“push factors.”  Emigration often results from poor conditions at home, and is sometimes 
referred to as an “externality of underdevelopment” (Massey et al. 1998; Sassen 1989; Bermeo 
2010). For example, one person whom I interviewed noted that people are often pushed out of 
their country because of negative factors such as drug violence (Interview 5). Whatever the 
motivation, both sides of the political spectrum have a reason for wanting to decrease the factors 
that cause immigration.   
The neoclassical or “push-pull” migration theory emphasizes the individual’s decision to 
migrate based on economic motivations  (Castle and Miller, 2009).  According to this theory, 
wage disparities are the most important influence upon migration, and as the perceived wage gap 
between the sending and receiving nations narrows, immigration will decrease (Massey et al., 
1998; Davis et al. 2000; Vargos-Silva 2011).  A second economic theory of migration, the 
segmented labor market model, takes into consideration the demand-side of the flows of 
migration, arguing that opportunities, or the perception of opportunities, in the receiving country 
are of paramount importance. This model, while still highlighting the importance of wage 
disparities, also incorporates considerations of institution, race, gender, and other segmentations 
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in the market, as well as employers and governments.10  In these models, the economic 
motivations of individual migrants, migrant families, and larger communities are founded in the 
notion that prosperity and a higher income level can be achieved in the destination country 
(Böhning 1994).  It is important to remember that there are also migrants fleeing repressive 
regimes, and migrants seeking refuge after political or environmental crisis, but I focus on 
economically motivated migration, under the assumption that policymakers believe that the bulk 
of migrants from Latin America to the US are driven by economic factors. 
Given that members of Congress are assumed to want to decrease further immigration, 
using a “root causes” approach is one way to respond to immigration. This approach consists of 
addressing the supposed driving factors of migration such as violence, wealth disparity, or 
human rights violations, as an indirect means to curb migration through development (Castles & 
Van Hear 2011).  Foreign aid provides one way to address the “underdevelopment” root cause.  
This approach differs from securing the border by decreasing the need of migrants to come at all.  
De Haas (2010) notes that there has been resurgence in optimism regarding the ability of 
development to reduce migration.  While de Haas is skeptical about the ability of programs to be 
effective, he recognizes that it is a popular policy approach.   
 Evidence that policymakers favor a “root causes” approach emerged in my interviews.  
One person I interviewed expressed the need to help immigrant sending countries build 
economic capacity so that these countries can better employ their own citizens, using the 
paradigm of “teaching them to fish” (Interview 1). Because immigration has long-term 
consequences, interviewees noted that there are incentives to address the root cause of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  A third model, the World Systems or Historical Structure Theory, revolves around the idea of international 
migration systems, and the way that countries become increasingly entangled. Though this theory has less to do with 
my analysis, it is important to acknowledge it in the discussion of migration theory (Massey et al 1998; Castles & 
Miller 2009).	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problem rather than just minimizing the short-term effects.  Especially in Latin America, 
immigration has continued for many years, and border security approaches have not eliminated 
the inflow of people.  Several respondents remarked that in the short term, immigration may call 
for a security-based approach of training law enforcement or discouraging migration at the 
border, but in the long term, the way to address this challenge is through building economic 
capacity in Latin America (Interviews 1, 2, 4).   
Davis et al. (2000) finds that sustained growth decreases migration.  Related literature 
notes, however, that there is not a linear relationship between level of development in a sending-
country and level of emigration.  Castles and Van Hear (2011) discuss a “migrant hump”—as a 
country grows economically, initially this growth will lead to an increase of emigration because 
people will have more resources to use for transportation.11  The effect of development on 
migration depends on the wealth of the country in consideration.  For poorer countries, 
development may initially increase migration, but as the countries continue to develop, migration 
again decreases. The idea of a “migrant hump” describes why people migrate at different levels 
of development, and is important for understanding how politicians might consider immigration.  
Immigration is highest in middle-income countries, but it may level off with higher development, 
which could lead policymakers to decide that in the long-term it is worth giving development aid 
to help decrease migration.  
I next assume that a sufficient number of policymakers believe that aid can sometimes be 
used as a means of promoting development in the recipient country. Though none of the writings 
on aid effectiveness claim aid to be effective all of the time, neither do they claim that aid has 
never been or can never be effective.  The contrasting ideas of aid optimists such as Sachs (2004) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mahendra (2014) found, however, that in the case of NAFTA, this was a short-term effect, and seems to have 
evened out.  
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and aid pessimists like Easterly (2003) continue to be debated. Theoretically, Easterly (2003) is 
concerned that receiving governments have little incentive to use aid money well, and that 
donors do not hold them accountable to the original conditions.  Empirically, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2004) finds no robust empirical evidence that aid is effective, and claim that even 
under a very optimistic model, the returns are of small magnitude. Others counter that argument 
with scenarios in which aid can in fact have a positive effect on economic growth (Wright and 
Winters 2010; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Burnside and Dollar 2000).  Bearce and Tirone (2010) 
describe a process of growth in which aid leads to economic reform or policy change, and these 
policies then lead to economic growth and development.  They find that this mechanism works in 
the Post-Cold War era, because once the strategic security motive of gaining allies against 
communism is removed, donor countries can credibly threaten to withdraw aid if conditionality 
is not met. If governments are prudent in deciding which countries and which sectors receive aid, 
development aid can spur growth through increased resources and institutions (Wright and 
Winters 2010; Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
Even if there are mixed reviews on whether aid actually improves development, what is 
essential for my theory is that a sufficient number of policymakers believe it can be effective.  
Several interviewees (1, 3, 5) mentioned that aid can be effective, but it must be continually 
reevaluated to better refocus the process and invest in programs that have been successful.  
Interviewee 2 talked about the great success of aid to improve conflict and security concerns in 
recipient countries. Even in an atmosphere of aid skepticism, it is still important to understand 
how existing aid is allocated.  I contend that Congress and the relevant agencies proportionally 
allocate the available amount to those countries where aid can make the most difference, or 
where it is thought that aid funds will affect migration patterns.  
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If policymakers in the US want to target development and growth goals in Latin America, 
they may use foreign aid as one way to do so. In Interview 2, the person with whom I spoke said, 
“some people say that immigration is bad, so let’s punish them by cutting their aid.  But I say 
that doesn’t make any sense—why are you going to make the poor countries poorer?” In terms of 
migration-motivated development, the US will give more aid to countries that send more 
immigrants in hopes that immigrant-sending countries will develop and the perceived benefit of 
migrating will decrease. Berthélemy (2009) finds that increasing aid reduces migration pressure 
in all sending countries above a certain income per capita threshold.  Similarly, Gaytán-Fregoso 
and Lahiri (2000) create a theoretical economic model, demonstrating that addressing 
unauthorized immigration via aid should work when the economic benefit of aid received is 
sufficient to eliminate the economic need to migrate.   
As a mechanism to reduce the number of immigrants coming to the US from Latin 
American countries, I predict that US politicians will allocate aid among Latin American 
countries to reflect the flow of migrants by sending-country. I expect to see a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between immigration to the US from a certain country, and the 
amount of aid sent to that country, all else being equal.  I expect that immigration is a factor in 
foreign aid allocation to Latin America because policymakers hope foreign aid and the resulting 
economic development will decrease the factors that push migration.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of immigrants coming from a Latin American country in a given year 
will positively affect the amount of economic aid given to that country by the US in subsequent 
years. 
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I also expect that the effect of immigration on aid allocation is contingent on the level of 
development in the aid-recipient country.  I propose that policymakers in the US view migration 
from low-income and high-income countries as originating from different root causes.  Flows of 
immigration from low-income countries may be attributed to the effects of underdevelopment, 
while flows of immigration from high-income countries may be attributed to other causes such as 
political repression or a desire for further educational or social opportunities.  If this is the case, 
the US as a donor country will give more aid to low-income immigrant-sending nations because 
theirs is the type of immigration that is likely caused by underdevelopment, and as such it could 
be addressed by stimulating development through aid.  The paradox of this, due to the “migrant 
hump,” is that aiding these nations could first increase immigration before decreasing it, so 
policymakers would must be willing to first send the country through a period of higher 
immigration before it decreases, if this is to transfer to policy decisions.  Though it is often 
assumed that politicians have only short-term interests in mind, several of my interview 
respondents (Interviews 1, 2) said that they favor a long-term sustainable solution to immigration 
rather than a short-term approach.  Despite the paradox of the migrant hump, I expect that 
policymakers will use aid to address migration (especially in low-income countries), because that 
is where the migration is most likely a symptom of underdevelopment.  This leads me to my 
second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of immigration on aid is conditional upon the level of 
development in the receiving country, and is stronger at lower levels of development 
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Before testing my theory qualitatively, I will look at congressional hearings for 
qualitative evidence that my assumptions about the allocation process are plausible.  Independent 
of the statistical results, I wish to determine if there is qualitative evidence that the process of 
foreign aid responds to immigration.  I am interested in determining when in the decision 
making-process immigration is considered, and what iteration of the immigration debate is most 
important to members of Congress.  The following sections flesh out my methods of analysis and 
presents the key findings.  
 
ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
I now examine the qualitative context of foreign aid allocation through congressional 
hearings on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill.  To bring some credibility to the causal 
nature of my theory, I collected and analyzed subcommittee hearings for the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bills from the years 1991 to 2012. 
When compiled, this is a total of 130 documents.12 I chose to analyze the subcommittee hearings 
rather than the final Appropriations Bill to get a better sense of what is discussed and prioritized 
on the floor, and to understand the concerns of the important agencies and interested groups 
beyond that which is published in the final bill.  For each year, there are six or seven compiled 
documents of hearings from the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs.  The first two documents of the House 
hearings are generally budget justifications of big donor agencies, such as the Department of 
State and USAID, as well as organizations such as the Inter-American Fund, the Export-Import 
Bank, the US Trade and Development Agency, the Peace Corps, and the Secretary of State.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  I examined each of the 130 hearings to get a sense of the format, trends, and priorities in the conversation on aid 
to Latin America.  The hearings from which I quote directly in this section are cited along with the rest of my 
sources.  However, more complete information on my sample can be found in the Appendix A.  
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remaining documents from the House of Representatives and Senate may be testimonies from 
related individuals and organizations, subject-specific appendices, or transcripts of the on-the-
floor hearings.  I looked through each of the documents to get a sense of the main concerns for 
Latin America, and to see if immigration is among the reasons given to request aid for Latin 
American countries. 
Because this is a foreign aid bill and not an immigration bill, the purpose of the hearings 
is to determine which countries need the most aid or represent the biggest US interests, not to 
decide how respond to immigration. As such, most of the immigration discussion in these 
hearings revolves around the causes of immigration.  In this sense, immigration is a part of the 
aid discussion both to signify that the situation in the home country is compelling people to come 
to the US, and to imply that the US should pay attention to that country because it sends many 
immigrants. From within this framework, three main schemas for immigration emerge: 
instability in the sending country, public health or environmental concerns, and economic issues.  
The first two of these are almost exclusively discussed as push factors of migration, while the 
third (economic) straddles the divide between “push factor” and “response mechanism.”  I have 
outlined the three themes as distinct in order to display the dominant ideas that I found while 
reading the hearings, though they are often intertwined. The language with which immigration is 
discussed also changes over time, as the conversation in Latin America mirrors foreign policy 
concerns in other parts of the world.   
Relevant organizations prepare tables and descriptions of how they are going to spend the 
money on specific programs, and they present this plan to the Subcommittee as part of a request 
for the funds necessary to carry out these programs. Immigration is most frequently mentioned 
by USAID and the Department of State, although the topic arises in statements by the Inter-
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American Foundation and the Peace Corps as well. Latin American immigration is mentioned in 
at least one of the documents from every year in my sample.13  Immigration and the concerns of 
immigrants are most evident as the Subcommittee is presenting and considering individual 
country specifications.  Often (especially for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Mexico, 
Ecuador, and Colombia) immigration is stated very early in the country descriptions as a concern 
or motivation for the programs supported. The desire to change the patterns of Latin American 
migration is expressed through phrases such as “controlling flows of immigration” (FOEFRPA, 
FY1992 Part 3),14 “reducing immigration pressures” (FOEFRPA FY1994, Part 1), “the 
immigration problem” (FOEFRPA, FY1999 Part 3) and “stemming the flow” of migrants 
(FOEFRPA, FY2008 Part 2).  
The mention of immigration in the hearings and justifications for the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Bill brings credibility to the idea that the connection between immigration and 
allocation is causal.  I do not purport that other determinants are being replaced or overshadowed 
by considerations of immigration, but rather that immigration is another one of many factors 
considered in deciding the United States’ interests in Latin America.  Most times that Latin 
American migration is discussed, it is framed as “illegal immigration,” but there are also many 
instances in which “migrants” or “immigration” are discussed without any specification of 
legality or lack thereof, and it can be concluded that some of the same “push factors” influence 
legal and illegal immigration alike. The main topics that arise in regard to Latin American aid 
allocation are combatting narcotics, strengthening the competitiveness of the region in global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Though it relates less to my theory on aid allocation to Latin America, post-Soviet Jewish migration to Israel is 
discussed copiously in these hearings as a reason to give more aid to Israel (so that they might better be equipped to 
absorb the immigrant population).  This is an argument for aid to the immigrant-receiving country rather than the 
immigrant-sending country, but it shows that global immigration is considered in the allocation process. 
14 The hearings from each year are titled, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations,” and will be abbreviated hereafter as FOEFRPA.  In 2008, this subcommittee changed its name to 
be the “Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” but for consistency, and because the 
majority of quotations in this section are from before 2008, I will use the same acronym for all internal citations.  
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markets, strengthening institutions, preventing environmental degradation, responding to 
international migration, and instilling democratic norms.  Of these, counter-narcotics, 
environmental protection, and the creation of economic opportunities are consistently the biggest 
concerns.  Immigration is mentioned less than drugs or economic stability, but often is a part of 
both of those discussions, as well as being an independent concern for the region.   
Latin American immigration sometimes emerges in the on-the-floor hearings, but it is 
more evident in the pre-prepared budget justifications.  On-the-floor discussion mostly surrounds 
current world events in other regions, especially in Middle Eastern and Eastern European 
nations, during the time period of my analysis.  However, there are some years when on-the-floor 
hearings are dominated by Latin American concerns, such as after the Haitian earthquake (2010) 
and at the beginning of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (2001).  In those years, immigration is 
mentioned either as a symptom of one of these problems or as an independent policy concern in 
the region.  
 First, immigration is often posed as a result of insecurity and instability in the country of 
origin.  The framework is security-oriented, as repression and internal conflict in the sending 
country drive immigration to the US, but also because there is sometimes the implication that 
such immigration threatens the security of the US border. In these cases, the testifying agency 
will request more funds so as to decrease the pressures that lead people to migrate.  Sometimes, 
this framework corresponds with a specific event in the immigrant-sending nation.  In the case of 
Cuba, the Department of State notes that a “breakdown of order in a post-Castro Cuba could 
threaten the United States with massive, uncontrolled illegal immigration, leaving us with 
difficult options to control U.S. borders” (FOEFRPA FY2001, Part 1A, 896).  
	   31 
A slightly different expression of security concerns in the sending country is the rhetoric 
of drugs and immigration—either linking one causally to the other, or mentioning them 
simultaneously as co-symptoms of poverty and instability.  Sometimes, members of Congress or 
federal agencies note that the agricultural and trade aspects of narcotics in Latin America operate 
in tandem with illegal migration. USAID states that “[an] important objective with respect to 
[Latin America and the Caribbean] is halting the migration of illegal immigrants and narcotics 
into the United States” (FOEFRPA FY2001, Part 3, 101), thereby connecting the two as parallel 
concerns.  In the following excerpt from Ecuador’s program description, USAID again exhibits 
this narco-security orientation towards immigration:  
 “Ecuador's chronic instability is a major source of illegal immigration and drugs 
transiting to the United States. Border areas in particular lack the political 
stability, security, and alternative development necessary for their vulnerable 
populations to resist the corrupting power of drug smugglers.” (FOEFRPA 
FY2009, Part 2, 704). 
 
A second schema by which immigration is mentioned as part of the budget justifications 
is through the topic of public health and environmental concerns. Latin American immigration is 
mentioned within the conversation of HIV/AIDS prevention, the spread of tuberculosis and 
polio, and the broader health concerns that face migrants. In 1999, USAID wrote that  
“Communicable diseases such as cholera, HIV/AIDS, malaria, dengue fever, chagas and 
measles may cause problems in this country if they are not addressed in the region…. In 
view of current migration and travel patterns, the epidemic in LAC threatens not only to 
thwart the region's development but also to aggravate U.S. control efforts” (FOEFRPA 
FY1999, Part 1B, 2589).  
 
 In this model, more aid is requested towards public health organizations so as to avoid 
the spread of diseases through migration.  Environmental concerns are linked to immigration 
because natural disasters or episodes of environmental degradation cause people to leave their 
place of residence. For example, it is noted that a hurricane “which devastated Honduras and 
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Nicaragua, affected Costa Rica in the form of increased illegal immigration and collateral 
environmental damage” (FOEFRPA FY2001, Part 1A, 895).  In both the public health and 
environmental examples, immigration is expressed as a symptom of something larger, as part of 
the argument that the region needs increased US aid for environmental protection and disease 
control. 
Thirdly, immigration is framed alongside economic reasoning for foreign aid allocation.  
Until now, I have been considering the ways that the hearings conceptualize the causes of 
immigration.  Economic strife is believed by politicians to be a push factor of immigration, but 
economic development is also framed as a potential solution.  There are several mentions of the 
idea that development will decrease the incentives for people to migrate.  For example, in 
describing the assistance program in Haiti in 2007, the Department of State reports that “US 
programs to reduce poverty, foster broad-based economic growth, and mitigate environmental 
degradation will address conditions that contribute to instability and illegal immigration” 
(FOEFRPA FY2007, Part 1A, 920).  The Department of State report from the 2006 hearings 
combines the interests of market expansion and immigration reduction in its claim that “Broad-
based economic development in El Salvador will improve prospects for US exports and help 
reduce the pressures driving illegal immigration” (FOEFRPA FY2006, Part 1, 1002). The 
following passages further display the link between economic problems that cause migration and 
economic solutions that can slow immigration to the US.  
 “Broad-based economic growth, open markets, and more jobs in Nicaragua not 
only offer an expanding market for U.S. exports and investment but also help 
stem the flow of illegal immigration to the United States” (FOEFRPA FY2001, 
Part 1B, 2369). 
 
“By promoting prosperity in El Salvador through USAID programs and 
mechanisms such as CAFTA, the United States can help strengthen the 
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Salvadoran economy, thereby reducing the flow of economic migrants to the 
United States, as well as the country’s vulnerability to narcotics trans-shipment 
and trafficking in persons” (FOEFRPA FY2004, Part 1B, 535). 
 
“This would develop a dynamic entrepreneurial class that will in turn employ 
many more people and ultimately, increase Mexico's workforce and 
competitiveness and reduce incentives for migration” (FOEFRPA FY2007, Part 
1B, 1789). 
 
The conversation surrounding immigration in foreign aid hearings shifts over 
time.  During the early 1990s, the primary foreign aid concerns were to encourage post-
Soviet democratic transitions, to assist new countries in establishing capitalist economies, 
and to enhance regional stability and rule of law.  Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel is 
a very prevalent topic, but Latin American migration is mentioned as well.  In the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the implication that decreased immigration is good for US interests, and 
therefore a justification for more aid, is made often and very clearly.  In the later 2000s, 
unauthorized migration is still mentioned as a foreign aid concern, but the direct 
connection between immigration and aid is not as clear.  This could be due to an 
increased veil of jargon or the changing political debate on immigration in the US, or it 
could be that immigration was more pertinent to the aid conversation in earlier years 
(despite the total level of Latin American immigration to the US remaining about the 
same throughout the examined time period).  
In the previous chapter, I theorized that immigration would be an additional motive for 
aid, specifically that politicians would focus on decreasing economic push factors of migration 
by allocating development aid to immigrant-sending nations.  Here, I conclude that this schema 
is present in the examined congressional hearings, but immigration is not discussed only in the 
context of economic push factors of migration. Aid for immigrant-sending countries is also 
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discussed as a response to the other challenges in the region, namely narcotics and environmental 
concern.  In addition to the “give aid so fewer economic migrants come” narrative, the 
congressional hearings imply that there is also a “give aid so that society will stabilize (and 
secondarily, this will make fewer migrants come)” narrative.  There is disagreement over which 
societal ill causes emigration (economic hardship or sociopolitical strife), but immigrant-sending 
countries still attract the attention of relevant policymakers during the allocation process.  It is 
clear that immigration is a regional concern, and in the context of foreign aid hearings, 
presumably it is mentioned because it justifies the allocation of more funds to the region.  
Moving forward into a quantitative statistical analysis, I operationalize these concepts to 
test my hypotheses, but the implications of the qualitative investigation are important.  It is 
plausible that the connection between aid and migration is causal, since immigration is 
mentioned fairly often alongside other known aid determinants in the congressional hearings.  
Additionally, since it is clear that immigration is a regional concern for Latin America, I expect it 
to be a significant statistical determinant.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To test my hypotheses, I use a multivariate regression model in which the expected 
determinants of US foreign aid allocation are incorporated as independent variables, and foreign 
aid is measured as the dependent variable. My data is a country-year panel dataset, so I use a 
Prais-Winsten regression model fit for panel data.  I start my analysis with data from 1991, and 
most of the variables I use are available through the year 2012.  I begin with 1991 to eliminate 
the Cold War period, as aid was allocated much differently during this time period, with a strong 
emphasis on containing Communism.  Though there are many indicators that could conceivably 
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affect aid allocation or account for a perceived relationship between immigration and foreign aid, 
I have picked those that represent the determinants of aid discussed in the literature, as well as 
those that are specifically of interest for my theory.  Some of the variables that I collected to act 
as controls were highly collinear with other control variables, so I have selected a subset of 
variables that represents the important factors, without any two having a bivariate collinearity 
above 0.50.15   
 My dependent variable is annual foreign aid from the US to each of the countries in Latin 
America, measured as total ODA commitments in constant 2012 US dollars.  Although USAID 
Greenbook data is often used as a measure of foreign aid from the US, I decided to use ODA 
figures because they report USAID spending as well as other Department of State and Executive 
Branch agencies that receive federally allocated funds. I have scaled ODA to GDP to account for 
the size each country.   
The independent variable of primary interest is the annual flow of immigrants from each 
Latin American country to the US.  Though unauthorized immigration is a large policy concern 
in the US, it is very difficult to estimate due to its clandestine nature. In the US, an estimated 
28% of the total immigrant population, and 58% of Mexican immigrants to the US, are 
undocumented (Migration Policy Institute 2015; Baker and Rytina 2013).  I have operationalized 
immigration by using data on legal migration to the US as reported by the Department of 
Homeland Security, because it is the best per-country estimate of migration, though it does not 
account for unauthorized immigration.  I also collected data on immigrant stock (total immigrant 
population) as provided by the OECD, which accounts for some (but not all) of the 
undocumented immigrant population.  There is a bivariate correlation of 0.95 between this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  More complete information on each of these variables, their sources, and transformations applied to each variable 
can be found in the Data Appendix (Appendix B).	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measure and the legal migration measure. The coverage for the stock variable, however, is very 
poor, so I use it only as a robustness check.  These should work as valid proxies for the political 
response to flows in migration, in part because public opinion and media rhetoric tend to group 
all immigrants together rather than distinguishing between those with and without 
documentation. 
 Using the absolute number of immigrants per country-year (taken as a natural log) 
reflects the notion that policymakers are concerned with which countries send the most number 
of immigrants in a given year. Change in migrant stock also reflects the absolute number of 
immigrants, but in terms of the net change of migrants residing in the US, hopefully capturing 
some of the undocumented immigrants.  A different way to scale the immigration variable is by 
measuring immigration per capita, or immigration as a percentage of the sending country’s 
population.  This, different from the absolute number of immigrants, corresponds to the idea that 
politicians are most concerned with immigration as a reflection of the political and economic 
situation in the sending country. I estimate several regression models, one with each 
measurement of immigration flow.  I decided to use flows of immigrants rather than cumulative 
stock of migrants residing in the US,16 because I expect that yearly foreign aid allocation 
responds to the number of incoming migrants rather than the existing migrant population in the 
US. 
 The following figures illustrate ODA allocated to and immigration from the countries in 
my dataset, averaged over all years in the dataset.17  Figure 1 displays the variation in levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Here, my use of “cumulative stock” should not be confused with my use of “change in immigrant stock.”  Change 
in immigrant stock, though the data is from the same source, measures the yearly flow of immigrants through net 
change in cumulative stock.	  17	  In several of these measurements (immigration per capita, as well as ODA/GDP), Guyana presents itself as an 
outlier.  I have omitted Guyana from the bar charts so that the distribution of the other observations is better 
illustrated.  The implications of this outlier are further discussed in the Results section. 
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aid received by countries in my dataset.  Venezuela and Dominican Republic receive the highest 
amount of ODA scaled to GDP, but Mexico (a large source of immigrants), receives very little in 
comparison.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the different ways to scale immigration.  Mexico, though 
it has the largest amount of absolute migration, falls towards the middle of the dataset in terms of 
immigration per capita.  Belize and Guyana, though sending a small number of migrants, have 
very high immigration per capita measurements.  For this reason, I use each measure in a 
separate model as a means of checking robustness.  
 
Figure 1: Mean Level of Aid, All Years 
 
 
*Guyana= 0.41, omitted from graphic for better display 
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Figure 2: Immigration Per Capita, All Years  
 
*Guyana=1 percent; omitted from graphic for better display  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Absolute Number of Immigrants, All Years 
 
*Mexico= 190,000; omitted from graphic for better display 
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 I include the following explanatory variables in my model as an operationalization of the 
previously identified influences on aid allocation. To measure development and country size, I 
include the natural log of World Bank measures of GDP per capita and population. I measure 
geographic proximity to the US with information from the GeoDist database on the distance 
from each country’s capital to the US capital (taken as a natural log), because scholars have 
suggested that countries closer to the donor get more aid. To represent the type and quality of the 
aid-receiving government, I use Polity IV scores of democracy as well as the CIRI Human 
Rights project indicator of physical integrity rights, which represents the extent to which torture, 
disappearance, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonment occur.  I expect there to be a 
positive relationship between Polity score (or human rights, as a high score for this measure 
means more respect for rights) and aid, as an indication that the US rewards democratic or well-
governing countries.  Polity Score and the CIRI physical integrity rights measure have a bivariate 
correlation of only 0.31, so I include them both in the model.  I use Voeten’s UN Voting Affinity 
S-scores to measure similarity of interests.18  As markers of the US export market and the 
bilateral trade relationship between the US and each recipient, I use the IMF direction of trade 
statistics to compute the percent of total US exports that go to each Latin American country.  A 
dummy variable for whether or not the US has a preferential trade agreement with each country 
in a given year is another measure of the economic relationship between each country and the US 
(and has a bivariate correlation with US Exports of only 0.43). To measure natural disasters, I 
use data from the EM-DAT database, specifically a sum of the “total affected” and “total killed” 
categories (of which I take the natural log), which signifies the absolute number of people 
affected by the event in a given year.  Because several interviewees noted that Congressional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Though Alliance S-scores are often considered the better measure of global affinity between nations, most of the 
Latin American countries are involved in the same alliances, so I use UN data in this instance.  More information on 
how this indicator is calculated is available in the Data Appendix (Appendix B). 
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politics greatly color the aid process, I have included a dichotomous variable to signify whether 
there was a Democratic or Republican majority in the US House of Representatives each year.  I 
also create a similar dichotomous variable that signifies the political party of the President as an 
alternative to the House partisanship measure, though primary tests use the Congressional 
majority variable since the aid process is Committee-based.  In a further effort to account for US 
public opinion of immigration in each year, I use information on the percent of Gallup 
respondents each year that answered that they would like to see a decrease in immigration.  
 There were several variables that I originally collected but have not included in my 
primary models.  Among the stability indicators—CIRI physical integrity rights, Polity Major 
Episode of Political Violence, PRIO civil war data, and WGI political stability—the CIRI 
indicator of physical integrity rights had the best coverage for the time period under 
consideration, and it best measures the human rights abuses that result from political unrest, but 
the other measures are used in checks of robustness.  Because these variables correlate highly 
with other measures that I did include, there is little concern for omitted variable bias. 
Among my dataset, there appears to be a curvilinear “migrant hump” (Figure 4) reflecting 
Castles and Van Hear’s writing, which suggests that as an immigrant-sending country develops,  
emigration will initially increase before possibly decreasing  (2011).  This emphasizes the need 
to understand how politicians consider immigration in relation to economic development.  If the 
data points beyond the “hump” show that high levels of development are associated with less 
migration, politicians may be likely to consider development as a way to decrease immigration—
that is, if they can get low- and middle-income countries “past the hump” via development aid, 
then immigration will decrease.   
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Figure 4: Migration and GDP per Capita (“Migrant Hump”) 
 
These descriptions illustrate important trends, but a multivariate analysis is needed in 
order to draw any conclusions or begin to establish causation.  After looking at the methods of 
scholars such as Bermeo (2009) and Berthélemy et al (2009), I decided to use a Prais-Winsten 
panel regression to test my hypotheses.  
The Prais-Winsten is a useful estimation because it accounts for the observations of the 
previous year, and incorporates panel corrected standard errors.  I use the ar(1) correlation option 
for autocorrelation as an alternative to fixed or random effects, assuming that the output variable 
depends on its own previous values. I use pairwise selection to avoid dropping too many cases. 
Because I expect serial dependence in the dependent variable (that is, the amount of aid 
previously given to a country is a good indication of subsequent allocations), I also run the 
model with a lagged-dependent variable, including ODA/GDP as a one-year lagged independent 
variable.  
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The writings of Massey et al. (1998), Castles and Van Hear (2011), and Berthélemy et al. 
(2009) lead me to believe that migration operates differently at different levels of development.  
To test this, I run the model again, incorporating an interaction variable (immigration * aid) to 
test the effect of development upon the relationship between immigration and aid in a continuous 
sense.  Then I split the set of observations into “high development” and “low development” by 
marking which fall below and above the median value of GDP per capita, and run the original 
model twice again, once with each half of the dataset.  
 
RESULTS  
The results from my statistical models are presented below. These results show that 
immigration does have a statistically significant effect on aid allocation to Latin America.  This 
is effect is not completely robust—immigration is statistically significant in most but not all 
models, and not every measure of immigration is consistently statistically significant.  The effect 
of immigration is statistically significant in lower income recipients but not high-income 
recipients, and has a bigger magnitude in later years compared to earlier years.  Table 1 presents 
the results of the first four models, which test my hypotheses in slightly differing ways.  
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TABLE 1: Aid Determinants, Overall Sample 
 
 Model 1 
Immigrants 
per capita 
Model 2 
Absolute 
number of 
immigrants 
(log) 
Model 3 
Lagged 
dependent 
variable 
Model 4a 
Interaction 
variable 
Model 4b 
Categorical  
Interaction 
Variable  
ODA/GDP (t-1)   0.629*** 
(0.088) 
  
Immigration 0.199** 
(0.089) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.390** 
(0.168) 
0.326** 
(0.138) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.022** 
(0.010) 
-0.056** 
(0.022) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Immigration per capita * 
GDP per capita (log) 
   -0.0001** 
(0.000) 
-0.132** 
(0.053) 
Population (log) -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Distance to US (log) -0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
Polity IV score 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Human Rights -0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
UN Voting Affinity -0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.035 
(0.025) 
US Exports 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Natural Disaster (log) -0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Democrat Majority in 
Congress 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
US public opinion on 
immigration  
-0.001 
(0.377) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Preferential trade 
agreement (dummy) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.027** 
(0.010) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.341** 
(0.165) 
0.812** 
(0.333) 
0.084 
(0.052) 
-0.098 
(0.159) 
-0.091 
(0.111) 
Number of Observations 385 385 381 385 390 
Number of Countries 22 22 
 
22 22 22 
Prob>chi2 0.053 0.252 0.000 0.066 0.017 
Significant at *0.10,  **0.05, ***0.01 
 
	   44 
Table 1 includes the primary models that test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  Models 1 
through 3 pertain to Hypothesis 1, which states that immigration to the US has a positive effect 
on US aid to that country.  In Model 1, immigration per capita has a positive and statistically 
significant effect, signaling that higher immigrant-sending countries receive more aid.  The 
absolute number of immigrants (in Model 2) is not significant at the 0.05 level.  In all remaining 
models, I use immigration per capita as the measure of immigration flows, but I also run each 
model with absolute number of immigrants and change in immigrant stock to check for 
robustness, as discussed below.19  
My findings echo the findings of other literature on foreign aid.  In both models, 
population, polity score, GDP per capita, disaster, Congressional majority, and preferential trade 
agreements are statistically significant.  The percent of total US exports is positively and 
statistically significant, but only in Model 1.  Interestingly, the natural disaster variable has a 
negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that countries with more people affected by 
natural disaster receive less aid.  If countries experiencing natural disasters receive immediate aid 
rather than aid in the subsequent years, the effect of disasters on aid allocation might not be 
reflected in my one-year lagged model.  Also interesting is that the preferential trade agreement 
term has a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that countries with trade agreements 
receive less aid.  This could be a result of the push to replace aid with trade.  It could be that 
politicians assume that having a trade agreement is good enough and no further assistance is 
needed, or that the kind of countries with which the US signs trade agreements tend to be more 
developed than others in the region.  In these models, distance, physical integrity rights, voting 
affinity, and US public opinion have no significant association with aid.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  I use change in immigrant stock as a robustness check to attempt to include some of the population of 
undocumented migrants.  This model is not reported in Table 1 because there is poor coverage of the stock variable, 
but the implications are discussed later in this section.	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Figure 5 displays the relative implied effects of each significant variable from Model 1, 
in terms of standard deviations of ODA/GDP.  Immigration has the strongest implied effect on 
aid allocation, followed by the negative effect of GDP per capita on aid allocation. 
 
Figure 5: Implied Effects on Aid Allocation (As Implied by Model 1) 
 
Some methodologists suggest including a lagged dependent variable to account for serial 
dependence in time-series data.  In Model 3, ODA scaled to GDP is included as an independent 
variable, with the same one-year time lag as the other variables. Unsurprisingly, when included 
as an independent variable, ODA/GDP is very significant, and most of the other variables lose 
their significance.  US public opinion on immigration, although it is not significant in Model 1 or 
2, has a negative and significant coefficient in this model.  This variable is measured as “percent 
of respondents who said that they favor a decrease in migration,” so a negative coefficient 
implies that as negative public opinion on aid increases, the country receives less aid. This seems 
to contradict the idea that politicians want to send aid to immigrant-sending countries to keep 
immigrants out, for if there is more of a desire to keep immigrants out, there is more reason to 
	   46 
make staying at home an attractive option.  But, considering that a negative opinion of 
immigrants may also reflect a negative view of their country, this negative coefficient is 
understandable.  This variable does not vary by country, only by year, so it may only reflect 
other year-to-year trends rather than responses to immigration.  Without the public opinion 
variable, results for this model remain otherwise consistent. 
Model 4 tests the conditional effect of development on the relationship between 
immigration and aid. To test this hypothesis, I created an interaction variable that is the product 
of immigration per capita and GDP per capita.  Polity score, percent of US exports, 
Congressional majority, and trade agreements remain statistically significant in this model.  The 
coefficient for this interaction variable is negative and statistically significant, which suggests 
that the most developed, highest immigrant-sending nations get less aid.  The immigration term 
is positive and statistically significant, implying that at a development level of zero (or very 
low), immigration has a positive effect on aid allocation. This model indicates that when 
development is high, immigration has less of an effect on aid, and when development is low, 
immigration has more of an effect on aid.  
To graphically illustrate the interaction effect, I condensed GDP per capita into a 
categorical variable with four values (based on GDP per capita quartiles), and repeated Model 4 
with this categorical development variable in place of the continuous variable (reported as Model 
4b).20  Though this collapses development into only 4 values, it allows for a graphical prediction 
of aid at each categorical value of development (Figure 5).  For lower income countries (quartiles 
1 and 2), higher immigration has a strong positive effect on predicted aid.  For quartile 3, 
immigration has a smaller positive impact on the allocation of aid, and for the highest income 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Table 3 displays the distribution of country-years (excluding those dropped in Model 4 for missing data) across 
the 4 income levels and can be found in Appendix D. 
	   47 
level (quartile 4), increased immigration has a negative effect on the predicted amount of 
allocated aid. This further supports my second hypothesis that the relationship between 
immigration and aid is dependent on the level of development, and stronger in countries with low 
levels of developments.    
 
Figure 6: Conditional Effect of Development on Aid (Migrants Per Capita and ODA, by 
income quartile) 
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Table 2: Aid Determinants, Split Sample  
 
 Model 5a 
(low-income 
recipients) 
Model 5b  
(high-income 
recipients) 
Model 6a  
(1991-2001) 
Model 6b  
(2002-2012) 
Immigration per capita  0.269** 
(0.118) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.049** 
(0.021) 
0.367** 
(0.170) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.057** 
(0.027) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.029** 
(0.014) 
Population (log) 
 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Geographic Proximity (log) 0.030 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
Polity IV score 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
Human Rights -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
UN Voting Affinity -0.058 
(0.053) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.036) 
US Exports 0.077 
(0.051) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Preferential Trade 
Agreement 
-0.059** 
(0.027) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.054** 
(0.023) 
Natural Disaster (log) -0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Democrat Majority in 
Congress 
0.051** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.042** 
(0.019) 
US Public opinion on 
immigration  
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-3.13e-06 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.370 
(0.226) 
0.111*** 
(0.043) 
0.138 
(0.067) 
0.265 
(0.214) 
Number of Observations 187 196 174 211 
Number of Countries 14 
 
14 21 22 
Prob>chi2 0.296 
 
0.000 0.000 0.041 
Significant at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01 
 
Table 2 displays a secondary set of tests, in which I split the dataset in half according to 
various indicators, to test whether perceived results are due to variations in development level or 
year rather than the chosen explanatory variables.  Model 5 splits the dataset based upon the 
GDP per capita of each observation.  The distribution of years in each income category is fairly 
even, though earlier years are slightly overrepresented in the low-income group.  Some countries 
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move between categories in different years, so several observations get dropped (because the 
previous year’s values are in the other group, and therefore the lagged values are “missing”), and 
the robustness of the results decreases.21  For Model 5 and 6 I ran the same Prais-Winsten 
regression as before, limited to one group of observations and then the other. Model 6 splits the 
dataset in half by year, to test whether different variables are statistically significant in both the 
earlier and later periods.  
Immigration per capita is only significant for the “low income” model (Model 5a), 
supporting the results of the interaction variable in Model 4 (namely, that immigration has a 
stronger effect on aid in low income countries).  Interestingly, the “physical integrity rights” 
variable is significant for the high-income group, though it is not significant in any of the other 
models.  The coefficient is negative, signifying that countries with better human rights practices 
receive less aid. If a country has better human rights indicators, they may have a better political 
situation and therefore need less aid (or send fewer migrants), but it also contradicts the idea that 
the US government rewards good human rights practices with more aid.   
For Model 6, I split the dataset into two time periods, to determine if the aid mechanism 
was different in the 1990s than in the 2000s.  Immigration per capita is statistically significant 
for both time periods, though with a much bigger coefficient for the more recent subset.  In the 
early time period, the only other statistically significant variable besides immigration is 
population.  In the more recent years, polity score, GDP per capita, percent of US exports, 
disaster, Congressional majority, and trade agreements are significant, similar to the other 
models.  Perhaps this means that my main model captures the aid process of the 2000’s better 
than the process of the 1990s, and that other variables drove allocation in the 1991-2001 period.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 Table 4 displays how many observations from each country fall into the “low income” category and can be found 
in Appendix D. 
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Possible omitted variables include military or security variables, and public health epidemics or 
events.  The change in determining factors in these two time periods could also be due to the 
lingering effects of Cold War policy, or changes in foreign policy following September 11, 2001 
(which falls right on the dividing line of the split dataset). 
Additionally, I performed a series of robustness checks.  If the logged absolute number of 
immigrants is used instead of immigrants per capita in Models 3 and 4, the immigration term is 
not statistically significant in either one.  This is not surprising for Model 3, where the lagged 
dependent variable is included, because none of the other independent variables are significant.  
However, for Model 4, with the interaction variable, when absolute number of immigrants is 
used rather than immigrants per capita, neither the interaction term nor the immigration term is 
significant.  In Models 5 and 6, with absolute number of immigrants, the results are consistent: 
immigration is statistically significant for low-income but not high-income recipients, and in 
more recent years but not earlier years.  Thus, immigrants per capita is consistently statistically 
significant while absolute number of immigrants is not.  This could signify that politicians 
conceptualize immigration relative to the size of the country—for example, it may be more 
important if a large percentage of the Colombian population migrates relative to the percent of 
the Mexican population that migrates, even if there are more Mexicans than Colombians in the 
US. Or, if one measure is consistently significant but the others are not, the effect of immigration 
on aid may not be very robust. I also try all the models with “change in immigrant stock” as the 
immigration variable, to account for some of the unauthorized immigrants. Change in immigrant 
stock is not statistically significant in any of the models.  However, there is only about 50 
percent coverage of this variable for the country-years I am testing, so this model has fewer 
observations, and it may tell us less about the overall pattern of aid allocation.  My study 
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indicates the need for further research in order to understand how unauthorized immigration 
affects foreign aid, because the model with a “change in immigrant stock” variable is not strong 
enough to fully account for the undocumented population or draw conclusions about the effect of 
the undocumented population on foreign aid. 
If Freedom House is used as an indicator of governance instead of Polity, immigrants per 
capita is still positive and statistically significant.  The Freedom House coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant, but because a score of 0 is the “most free” in Freedom House, this 
has the same implications for aid as does the Polity Score variable.  If US Presidential party is 
used rather than Congressional majority to account for US political atmosphere, immigration per 
capita remains statistically significant, and the Presidential Party dummy variable is statistically 
significant.  Additionally, if Civil Violence, Civil War, or Political Stability is used to measure 
conflict and human rights instead of Physical Integrity Rights, immigration remains statistically 
significant, though none of these human rights measures have statistically significant effects.  If 
the model is done in terms of “change variables” (ODA change, immigrant change, GDP per 
capita change), immigration growth is not significant at the 0.05 level.  This suggests that the 
level of migrants in a given year is more salient to politicians than the year-to year change. I tried 
the model with two- and three-year lags (as opposed to the baseline one-year lag), and 
immigration per capita remains significant.  Because Guyana is an outlier in several senses, I 
removed it from the sample as a test of robustness. Without Guyana in the sample, total number 
of immigrants is significant but immigration per capita is not.  Most other variables of statistical 
	   52 
significance do not change without Guyana in the sample.22  Migrant stock is sometimes 
statistically significant, but this alludes to a different causal mechanism (cumulative number of 
migrants) than the other measures of immigration (yearly flow of migrants), and leaves open the 
question of how politicians think about migration.  This is a question that merits future research. 
In summary, immigration, when operationalized as immigrants per capita, is consistently 
significant in my models.  Other known factors of aid allocation remain statistically significant, 
but immigration functions as an additional determinant of aid allocation.  If politicians are 
responding to the flow of immigrants, this could represent an interest for the situation in the 
home country.  Even if immigration does not have a robust effect on aid allocation, we have 
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that immigration has no effect on aid.  
 
CONCLUSION 
My study finds that immigration is a factor in US foreign aid allocation to Latin America. 
I find a positive, statistically significant relationship between immigration and aid.  Additionally, 
I consistently find that the relationship between immigration and aid is stronger in recipients with 
lower levels of development. My qualitative research supports these findings—in my interview 
research, politicians mention immigration as an important consideration and challenge in the 
Latin American region, one that necessitates a solution based upon long-term development.  
Additionally, the country-specific documents included in the congressional hearings frequently 
mention Latin American immigration. The discussion in the hearings mainly focuses on the push 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As noted in the “Data and Methods” chapter, Guyana is an outlier in both ODA/GDP and Immigration per capita, 
likely because of the small size of the nation, the large Guyanese migrant communities in New York, and the impact 
of natural disasters in this nation during my time frame.  Without Guyana in the sample, immigration per capita (in 
Model 1) is not statistically significant, but absolute number of immigrants (in Model 2) is positive and significant.  
Oddly, without Guyana in the sample, the lagged-dependent variable in Model 3 greatly decreases in significance. 
Models 4, 5, and 6 are consistent with the reported results.    
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factors of migration, how other important issues in the region (namely, instability, drug 
trafficking, and natural disasters) are inseparably related to immigration, and how development 
aid should work towards decreasing the root problems as well as the resulting migration.  There 
are various perspectives on how to treat immigrants in the US and how to immediately respond 
to global flows of migration, but regardless of whether an economic or security-oriented 
approach is better in the short-term, there seems to be some consensus (in Congressional 
documents as well as interviews) that in order to address the problem in a sustainable fashion, 
long-term capacity building through economic development presents one potential solution.   
These findings support my initial hypothesis that immigration is a determinant in aid 
allocation, and that immigrant-sending nations receive more aid, all else being equal.  These 
findings, however, should be understood as an additional exploration of aid determinants and not 
an argument against other known aid determinants.  In my study, other known factors of aid 
allocation (development indicators, disaster, trade variables, and domestic politics) remain 
significant.  Qualitative evidence suggests that immigration is not the primary motivation for aid 
in the Latin American region, but neither can it be ignored as an important factor.   
My theoretical mechanism is based upon the sending of aid to immigrant countries in 
order to decrease migration by decreasing the economic root cause. I theorized that more aid 
would be given to higher immigrant-sending countries because politicians assume that 
underdevelopment and economic hardship are one push factor of migration from Latin America 
to the US, and because a sufficient number of politicians view economic assistance as one way to 
spur growth (and therefore decrease immigration).  Assuming that politicians want to decrease 
migration to the US, either because they think immigration is bad for the US or because they 
realize that less migration is indicative of better conditions at home, economic aid would be used 
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as a mechanism to reduce immigration through development. In addition to sending aid to 
increase development and decrease immigration, my qualitative research points to other (though 
similar) mechanisms at play.  Aid is sent to decrease political instability, which in turn decreases 
immigration.  Aid is sent to decrease public health concerns, which in turn decreases 
immigration.  Aid is sent to help disaster recovery, which in turn decreases immigration.  This 
supports my “root causes” theory, though it necessitates further research to better understand the 
relationship between each of the root causes of immigration and the effect on aid.  
My study has several limitations.  I limited my thesis to a study of Latin America, both 
because I believe that this is the place where immigration is most salient in US politics, and 
because I wanted to exclude the variation between regions, but it is hard to know if the same 
causal mechanism is at play in other regions.  Bermeo (2010) finds a statistically significant 
relationship at the global level, but further research is necessary in order to establish causality 
and a qualitative understanding in other regions.  Additionally, I had a very small sample size for 
my interview research, due to the availability of Washington elite.  I was able to gain much 
understanding of the aid process, but as noted, the process is not very transparent.  For my time 
period of interest, Latin America is not the United States’ global priority, so less on-the-floor 
time is given to Latin American concerns than to other regions, making it harder to know what is 
really motivating aid, and necessarily requiring some dependence on pre-submitted statements. 
Policymakers may be mostly concerned about unauthorized immigrants from Latin America, but 
because the undocumented population is extremely difficult to measure, my study could not fully 
account for their effect, nor could I separate the effect of authorized and unauthorized 
immigration.  This highlights the need for more research and data about the undocumented 
population in the US.  Lastly, my study ends with 2012, but in the US, immigration has remained 
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(if not increased as) a debated policy concern in the years since 2012.  In fact, two interviewees 
(1, 6) said that immigration would be an explicit motive for aid in the 2015 Appropriations Bill, 
due to the recent surge of unaccompanied immigrant children. 
In terms of policy, this study suggests that politicians are aware of the international 
implications of migratory flows, a finding that could change the way immigrant groups lobby for 
aid to their countries of origin.  This knowledge is also important to the conversation on the 
politics of immigration.  Immigration affects both the sending and receiving countries, so the 
policy debate should not be constrained to the continental US.  Policymakers should be aware of 
the global implications of immigration (foreign aid and public flows of assistance being one of 
them), and expand the conversation on immigration beyond the US border.  That is, rather than 
only examining surface-level solutions, they should look further into the root causes of migration 
and the links between migration and other developmental challenges.  
  When I began this project, I asked two questions.  Does immigration affect aid 
allocation? And if so, what is the mechanism by which this relationship operates? To the first 
question, we can answer that immigration does affect aid.  Though the process is hard to 
understand and the robustness of results depends upon the operationalization of immigration, I 
have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that immigration is not a factor at all.  What is 
the mechanism?  My narrative of aid allocation consists of sending aid for the purpose of solving 
problems in the recipient nation, immigration being one of those problems.  Through sustained 
economic development, policymakers hope to support immigrant-sending countries—to make 
staying home a viable economic option, and to address the other sources of instability and 
hardship that pressure people to migrate to the US.    
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Going forward, scholars of foreign aid allocation should continue to consider flows of 
people as an important factor in aid allocation.  In determining a donor’s “interest” in recipient 
countries, scholars must recognize characteristics specific to the recipient country as well as the 
bilateral donor-recipient economic relationship, but they must also consider the transnational 
flows of people between donor and recipient nations.  My findings are important for the 
continuing intersection of diaspora studies and studies of the international political economy. 
Beyond the specific variables of Latin American immigration and US foreign aid, the 
international economy is inextricably linked to diaspora lobbying, remittances, and immigration 
policy—links that each merit further investigation so as to better understand the connection 
between flows of people and flows of monetary resources.   
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hrg-1993-hap-0032?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014.  
 
-----FY1999. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
1999 Part 1B: Justification of Budget Estimates (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/999/PT.1B). 105th 
Congress. 2nd session.  Jan. 1, 1998.  Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1998-hap-
0014?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY1999. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
1999, Part 3 (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/999/PT.3).  105th Congress. 2nd Session. Mar. 18, Apr. 1, 
1998.  Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.
hrg-1998-hap-0064?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014.  
 
-----FY2000. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2001 Part 1A: Justification of Budget Estimates (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2001/PT.1A). 106th 
Congress. 2nd Session. Jan. 1, 2000. Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.
hrg-2000-hap-0057?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2000. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2001, Part 3 (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2001/PT.3). 106th Congress. 2nd Session. Apr. 11, 13, 
2000. Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.
hrg-2000-hap-0064?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2001. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2001 Part 1B: Official Justification of Budget Estimates, Agency for International 
Development (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2001/PT.1B).  106th Congress. 2nd session.  Jan. 1, 2000.  
Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2000-hap-
0062?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014.  
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-----FY2004. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2004 Part 1B: Official Justification of Budget Estimates, Agency for International 
Development (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2004/PT.1B). 108th Congress. 1st session.  Jan. 1, 2003. 
Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2003-hap-
0053?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2006. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2006. Part 1A: Justification of Budget Estimates (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2006/PT.1A). 109th 
Congress. 2nd session. Jan. 1, 2005.  Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2005-hap-
0173?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
----- FY2006. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2006. Part 1B: Justification of Budget Estimates, Agency for International Development 
(Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2006/PT.1B). 109th Congress. 2nd Session.  Jan. 1, 2005. Retrieved 
from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.
hrg-2005-hap-0174?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2007. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2007. Part 1A: Justification of Budget Estimates (Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2007/PT.1A).  109th 
Congress. 2nd session. Mar. 1, 2006.  Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2006-hap-
0063?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2007.  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 
2007. Part 1B: Justification of Budget Estimates, Agency for International Development 
(Y4.AP6/1:F76/6/2007/PT.1B). 109th Congress. 2nd session. Jan. 1, 2006. Retrieved from 
ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2006-hap-
0061?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
 
-----FY2008. State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2008. Part 2: 
Agency for International Development FY2008 Budget Justification 
(Y4.AP6/1:ST2/4/PT.2). 110th Congress. 1st Session. Jan 1, 2007. Retrieved from 
ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2007-hap-
0021?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014.  
 
-----FY2009. State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2009. Part 2: 
Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Justification (Y4.AP6/1:ST2/4/2009/PT.2). 
110th Congress. 2nd Session. Jan. 1, 2008.  Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional at 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2009-hap-
0010?accountid=14244 on November 21, 2014. 
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APPENDIX A: CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
 
To collect the sample of Congressional Hearings, I began with a list of public law citations for 
the Appropriations Bills from 1991-2012.  For each year, the “Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Agencies” Appropriations Final Legislation is given a number, which can 
then be used to find all the related hearings in a database such as ProQuest Congressional.  Upon 
entering the public law citation into the database, the specific subcommittee hearings can be 
collected. I collected all of the hearings relating to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, totaling 130 documents.  These 130 hearings correspond 
to 22 public laws, and I have listed these public law numbers below.  
 
 
Fiscal Year Appropriations Legislation 
 
1991  101-513 
1992  102-266 
1993  102-391 
1994  103-87 
1995  103-306 
1996  104-107 
1997  104-208 
1998  105-118 
1999  105-277 
2000  106-113 
2001  106-429 
2002  107-115 
2003  108-7 
2004  108-199 
2005  108-447 
2006  109-102 
2007  110-5 
2008  110-161 
2009  111-8 
2010  111-117 
2011  112-10 
2012   112-74 
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APPENDIX B: DATA APPENDIX  
 
Below is a comprehensive listing of the variables collected for my analysis along with 
information on their source.  
 
Country-Years 
The data were collected for each of the following countries for the years 1991-2013.  Some small 
Caribbean nations were excluded from the dataset due to the lack of data on these countries in 
most of the databases used.  For statistical purposes, I use the Correlates of War (COW) country 
codes.  
 
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Suriname 
Uruguay 
Venezuela  
 
Bilateral Trade 
Bilateral Trade information comes from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics.  I use the indicators labeled “Value of Exports” and “Value of Imports,” each 
measured yearly in US dollars. As described in the data source, “the Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS) present current figures on the value of merchandise exports and imports disaggregated 
according to a country's primary trading partners. Area and world aggregates are included in the 
display of trade flows between major areas of the world. Reported data are supplemented by 
estimates whenever such data are not available or current.”  I have calculated a Total Trade 
Value by adding these two indicators, and Percent of Total US Trade by scaling the value of 
exports for a partner country to the total amount of US exports in that year. For some analyses I 
have taken the natural log of the total trade value.  The Direction of Trade Statistics can be found 
online at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/. 
 
Civil War 
To account for civil conflict within each country, I use the PRIO armed conflict database.  UCDP 
defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or  
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” I use the “intensity level” 
variable, defined as “the intensity level in the dyad per calendar year. Two different intensity 
levels are coded: minor armed conflicts (1) and wars (2).”  For years in which no conflict is 
recorded, I give the variable a value of zero.  The dataset is available online at 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.   
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Civil Violence  
I use the Polity Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset as another marker of internal 
violence.  I use the measurement of Total Civic Violence (CIVTOT), which is scaled from 1-10 
(10 being the highest magnitude of violence) for each country-year.  This measure encompasses 
the total summed magnitude scores for civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war.  
The dataset is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.  
 
Freedom House Score 
As an indicator of regime type or democracy, I use the Freedom House Freedom In the World 
indicator.  Data collected from the Country Ratings and Status file, available at 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VG0EH1fF9tI.  To best illustrate 
the political environment, I use the arithmetic average of the Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
scores for each country-year.  The Political Rights score evaluates electoral processes, political 
pluralism, and functioning of government; the Civil Liberties score represents freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights.   
 
Geographic Proximity to the US  
The CEPII GeoDist database measures the distance from each country’s capital to the US capital.  
Geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and 
longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the dist 
variable and the geographic coordinates of the capital cities for the distcap variable. These two 
variables incorporate internal distances based on areas.  I use the logarithmic transformation.  
The CEPII GeoDist database is available at 
http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6. 
  
Greenbook Foreign Assistance  
As defined in the dataset: ‘The annual update of the "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants," 
informally known as the "Greenbook," contains data of United States Government (USG) 
foreign assistance since 1945. Foreign assistance is categorized as either economic assistance or 
military assistance. Foreign assistance is reported by recipient country and organized by 
geographic region, without distinction between developed and developing countries. Any 
country which has received cumulative economic or military assistance over $500,000 since 
1945 and is considered an "Independent State" by the U.S. Department of State merits an 
individual country reporting.’  I collected both the total military and total economic aid for each 
country-year by aggregating the program totals, in constant 2012 US dollars. Prepared files 
available at https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/prepared.cfm.  
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
GDP is measured in Constant 2005 US dollars, collected from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators databank.  Defined as follows: GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  I use 
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GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and GDP per capita growth indicators, transformed as the 
natural log of (1+x).  
All World Bank Data collected from the WDI databank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators. 
 
 
Gross National Income (GNI) 
GNI is measured in Constant 2005 US dollars, collected from the WDI databank.  Defined as 
follows: GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to 
U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the 
sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included 
in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and 
property income) from abroad.  I use the GNI, GNI per capita, and GNI per capita growth 
indicators, transformed as the natural log of (1+x). 
 
Human Rights 
To measure human rights within the country, I collected data from the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project.  I use the Physical Integrity Rights Index, defined in the Codebook as “an additive index 
constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance 
indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government 
respect for these four rights).” The dataset is available at 
http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html.  
 
Immigrant Stock, OECD 
To measure total immigrant population in the US from each sending country (rather than flow of 
immigrants in a particular year), I use the OECD measure of immigrant stock.  Immigrant Stock 
is the cumulative foreign-born population of a country, all persons who have that country as the 
country of usual residence and whose place of birth is located in another country.  I use the 
“Stock of foreign-born population by Country of Birth” indicator, found at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=313703. 
 
Natural Disasters 
To account for disasters in a country year during the sample time period, I use the EM-DAT 
International Disaster Database.  Per the database, for a disaster to be logged, it must meet at 
least one of the following criteria: ten (10) or more people reported killed, hundred (100) or more 
people reported affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or call for international assistance.  
I use data from all of the subsets (Complex Disasters, Natural Disasters, and Technological 
Disasters), and use the sum of the “total killed” and “total affected” categories.  For country-
years with no marked disaster, I code the variable as 0.  I have transformed this variable as the 
natural log of (1+x).  The dataset can be found at http://www.emdat.be/. 
 
Number of Immigrants, Department of Homeland Security 
Data on immigration to the US by sending country is compiled from the 2003 and 2014 versions 
of the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.  I use Table 3 from both yearbooks, titled 
“Immigrants Admitted by Region and Country of Birth.”  For immigration per capita, I divide 
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this measure of immigration by the WDI measure of population.  Tables are available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/archives#1.  I use the natural log of (1+x) transformation.   
 
Number of Immigrants, OECD 
As a second measure of immigrant flows, I collect data from the OECD International Migration 
Database.  I use the “inflows of foreign population by nationality” indicator for each country-
year.  Data in the International Migration Database is mostly taken from individual contributions 
of national correspondents appointed by the OECD Secretariat, and can be accessed at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=313703   
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), OECD 
Economic aid is measured in ODA, as available in the OECD Query Wizard for International 
Development Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/) The DAC defines ODA as “those flows to 
countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions 
which are: 
i.  provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and 
ii.  each transaction of which: 
a)  is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as its main objective; and 
b)  is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” 
I use ODA as Total Bilateral Aid to All Sectors, measured as commitments and given in constant 
2012 USD.  I use ODA scaled to GDP, as well as ODA growth, and for both of these I take the 
natural log of (1+x). 
 
Political Stability 
I have collected, as a measure of political stability, the World Bank World Governance 
Indicators data, for the years 1996-2013.  I use the “Political Stability/No Violence” measure.  
As described by the authors, this indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.  It is measured as an 
estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance).  Data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
 
Polity Score  
Polity scores are used to measure individual regimes on a 21-point authority spectrum.  I use the 
POLITY2 Revised Combined Polity Score. This variable is a modified version of the POLITY 
variable. POLITY2 scores range from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
POLITY2 modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or 
“fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to 
conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). Complete dataset can be found at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html  
 
Population 
As gathered from the “population, total” indicator in the World Bank WDI Database, defined as 
follows: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all 
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residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in 
the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of 
origin.  The values shown are midyear estimates.  I use the natural log of (1+x) transformation of 
the data.  
 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
To account for trade agreements between the US and aid-recipient countries that may affect 
economic assistance allocation, I created a dummy variable.  The variable is assigned a value of 
1 if there is a trade agreement between the US and the recipient nation in a given year, and a 
value of 0 if there is no active trade agreement between the US and that nation.  I code the 
variable according to when the trade agreement goes into force, rather than when it was signed.  
Information on trade agreements is available from the International Trade Administration at 
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradeagreements/fta/tg_ian_002421.asp. 
 
Unemployment 
Unemployment is measured as percent of the total labor force that is without work but available 
for and seeking employment.  This WDI indicator is modeled after the estimates of the 
International Labor Organization.  Data available in the World Bank World Development 
Indicators Databank.  
 
UN Voting Affinity  
As a measure of similarity in international security preferences between the US and each Latin 
American Country, I use Voeten’s Affinity S-scores, specifically the measure labeled “s3un.” A 
score of -1 represents least similar interests, and a score of 1 represents most similar interests. As 
defined by the author, values for the Affinity index use 3 category vote data (1 = “yes” or 
approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue.)  The Affinity data are 
coded with the “S” indicator (“S” is calculated as 1 – 2*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of metric 
distances between votes by dyad members in a given year and dmax is the largest possible metric 
distance for those votes, see Signorino and Ritter 1999).  I use the “Affinity scores, cow country 
codes” dataset, available at 
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=38311&tab=file
s&studyListingIndex=0_cea38cfc2dfcc022817f39d68570. 
 
US Congressional Majority 
As an indicator of US domestic political context, I create a dummy variable for the majority 
party of the US House of Representatives in each year.  When there is a Republican majority in 
the House, the variable takes on a value of 0, and when there is a Democratic majority the 
variable is assigned a value of 1.  
 
US Presidential Party 
As another marker of political atmosphere in the US for a given year, I use a dummy variable for 
the party of the US president.  During years with a Republican president, the variable takes on 
the value 0, and the variable takes on a value of 1 in years with a Democratic President was in 
office.  In election years, the variable is coded based upon the serving president, and changes in 
the following year to reflect when the inauguration of a new president.  
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US Public Opinion on Immigration  
As a measure of US public opinion on immigration in each year, I use information from the 
Gallup Poll Historical Trends.  I use their question, “in your view, should immigration be kept at 
its present level, increased, or decreased?”  Because the percent of people who respond 
“decreased” has vacillated most in recent years, I use these percentages as a measure of public 
sentiment.  A higher value for this variable represents a more negative public opinion towards 
immigration.  In years with more than one response period, I use the mid-year July percentage, 
and in years with no data I linearly estimate the values base upon the nearest values.  Data was 
collected from the charts at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx.  
 
 
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS 
 
I sent meeting requests to 26 members of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs of the 112th and 113th Congress.  I chose to use these two Congresses as a 
sample because most members of earlier Congresses are no longer serving (and therefore very 
hard to contact), or they also served in one of these two Congresses.  Unfortunatly, I was unable 
to request a meeting with 29 members on these Subcommittees, either because they are retired or 
deceased, or because my request was rejected for being outside of their district. 
 
Because most members of Congress do not provide an email address, I used the online meeting 
request forms on each member’s website.  Some of these forms, due to a high volume of 
requests, do not accept requests from a zip code outside of their district.  For these members, I 
tried unsuccessfully, to contact staffers directly. Though all requests were addressed directly to 
members of Congress, the responses I received from the online meeting requests were all from 
staffers.  Some were willing to connect me to the member of Congress with which they work, 
and others offering to meet with me themselves. 
 
Of the 26 meeting requests I sent, I received 3 responses, and met with each of these people. 
Two staffers arranged for me a meeting with the member of Congress, while other staffers 
offered to meet with me themselves because the member of Congress was busy. The remaining 
three interviews were arranged via professional connections.    
 
All interviews were conducted in person, ranging from 30 to 60 minutes.  The interviews were 
semi-structured, starting with a list of questions but allowing for free responses and discussion of 
other relevant topics.   
 
 
Interview 1 
Member of Congress.  January 20, 2015 at 11:00 AM.  District Office 
 
Interview 2 
Member of Congress.  January 22, 2015 at 10:00 AM.  Washington, DC 
Arranged via website request 
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Interview 3 
Former Congressional Staff.  January 22, 2015 at 11:15 AM.  Washington, DC 
 
Interview 4 
Current Congressional Staff.  January 22, 2015 at 1:00 PM.  Washington, DC 
Arranged via website request 
 
Interview 5 
Current Congressional Staff.  January 23, 2015 at 10:00 AM.  Washington, DC 
Arranged via website request 
 
Interview 6 
Former Congressional Staff.  January 23, 2015 at 2:00 PM.  Washington, DC 
 
 
APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL TABLES  
 
Table 3: Distribution of Country-Years Across Income Quartiles (if in Model 4b sample) 
 
 4-Category Income Level  
Country 0 1 2 3 Total 
Argentina 0 0 1 20 21 
Bolivia 20 0 0 0 20 
Brazil 0 0 13 8 21 
Chile 0 0 0 19 19 
Colombia 0 7 13 0 20 
Costa Rica 0 0 13 6 19 
Cuba 0 9 7 4 20 
Dominican Republic 0 4 9 3 16 
Ecuador 0 14 5 0 19 
El Salvador 0 13 0 0 13 
Guatemala 0 20 0 0 20 
Guyana 8 0 0 0 8 
Haiti 20 0 0 0 20 
Honduras 19 0 0 0 19 
Mexico 0 0 0 21 21 
Nicaragua 20 0 0 0 20 
Panama 0 0 11 7 18 
Paraguay 10 6 0 0 16 
Peru 0 16 5 0 21 
Suriname 0 1 2 0 3 
Uruguay 0 0 4 11 15 
Venezuela 0 0 1 20 21 
Total 97 90 84 119 390 
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Table 4: Number of Observations per Country in “low income” category (if in Model 5a sample)  
 
Country Frequency Percent 
Bolivia 20 10.70 
Colombia 7 3.74 
Cuba 9 4.81 
Dominican Republic 4 2.14 
Ecuador 14 7.49 
El Salvador 13 6.95 
Guatemala 20 10.70 
Guyana 8 4.28 
Haiti 20 10.70 
Honduras 19 10.16 
Nicaragua 20 10.70 
Paraguay 16 8.56 
Peru 16 8.56 
Suriname 1 0.53 
Total 187 100.00 
 	  
